Abstract-Industrial cyber-physical systems (ICPSs) are widely applied in critical infrastructures such as chemical plants, water distribution networks, and power grids. However, they face various cyberattacks, which may cause physical damage to these industrial facilities. Therefore, ensuring the security of ICPSs is of paramount importance. For this purpose, a new risk assessment method is presented in this paper to quantify the impact of cyberattacks on the physical system of ICPSs. This method helps carry out appropriate attack mitigation measures. The method uses a Bayesian network to model the attack propagation process and infers the probabilities of sensors and actuators to be compromised. These probabilities are fed into a stochastic hybrid system (SHS) model to predict the evolution of the physical process being controlled. Then, the security risk is quantified by evaluating the system availability with the SHS model. The effectiveness of the proposed method is demonstrated with a case study on a hardware-in-the-loop simulation test bed.
However, ICPSs are vulnerable to external attacks due to the tight integration of cyber and physical parts [2] . Therefore, ensuring the security of ICPSs is an issue of great concern.
Security risk assessment (SRA) is a process to identify possible security threats and evaluate the potential loss typically measured by dollar values. It is used to guide attack mitigation actions, and thus is critical to ICPS protection [3] . In general, SRA is either qualitative or quantitative. Quantitative methods are preferred here because they provide a more accurate reflection of system status, thus facilitating better allocation of safeguard resources. While many SRA methods have been proposed for ICPSs, most of them are directly adapted from IT domains. Focusing more on information security risk in the cyber layer, they neglect the risk of cyberattacks on the physical system, referred to as cyber-to-physical (C2P) [4] risk in this paper. As cyberattacks may result in severe safety incidents in ICPSs [2] , assessing the C2P risk is highly demanded [5] .
Efforts have been recently made to SRA in ICPSs with awareness of the physical world. For example, a cybersecurity risk evaluation model is proposed for nuclear control systems [6] . It uses Bayesian networks (BNs) and event trees to quantify cybersecurity risk and predict the malfunction probability of the reactor protection system. In [7] , a multimodel framework is formed from a combination of BNs, fault trees, and event trees. It is used to compute the probability that a hazardous incident happens and evaluate the monetary loss caused by these incidents. The physical impact of a false sequential logic attack on ICPSs is investigated in [8] . This type of attack may cause equipment damage or facility destruction. A risk management framework is presented in [3] for ICPSs. It continuously monitors the system, quantifies the impact of cyberattacks, and carries out risk treatment.
In spite of these efforts, SRA in ICPSs is still challenging. Most previous studies on SRA in ICPSs have made simplified assumptions about the physical system. They have only focused on evaluation of cyber-layer network security [6] , [7] , [9] . On the other hand, the efforts that have addressed the physical layer generally abstract ICPSs as traditional feedback control systems and ignore cyber-physical interactions [3] , [8] . Moreover, existing approaches, to the best of our knowledge, do not support both real-time and quantitative C2P risk assessment for ICPSs.
This paper presents a novel SRA method for dynamic evaluation of the C2P risk in ICPSs. The method uses BN to model the attack propagation process in the cyber layer of ICPSs. This enables to estimate the probability of the components connecting with the physical process to be compromised. Employing these probabilities, a stochastic hybrid system (SHS) model is implemented to predict the evolution of the physical process. It is further used to evaluate its availability by computing the Mean-Time-To-Shut-Down (MTTSD). Then, the C2P risk is quantified based on the MTTSD metric. The contributions of this paper include the following.
1) BNs are integrated with an SHS model to analyze crossdomain attacks in ICPSs. 2) An unbiased minimum-variance state estimator is designed for estimation of the states of ICPS physical process under attack. 3) A new security metric, MTTSD, is introduced to quantify the C2P risk in ICPSs. This paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly introduces BNs and SHS modeling. Section III presents our risk assessment framework. Section IV describes BN-based attack modeling. Section V presents the C2P risk assessment method. Experiments are carried out in Section VI to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method. Finally, Section VII concludes this paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Bayesian Network
A BN is a directed acyclic graph in which nodes represent variables and directed arcs imply the conditional dependencies between these variables [10] . The state of each node in a BN is only dependent on its parent nodes. It is described by a conditional probability table (CPT). Given a BN with a set of binary
where pa i is the parent set of variable Y i . Quantitative risk assessment can be conducted through probabilistic risk analysis. BN is a useful probabilistic tool for risk assessment. When applied to SRA in computer networks, it is able to reason the causal dependencies between network states and, more importantly, calculate the occurrence probabilities of attacks. With these probabilities, the security risk R can be quantified by the following equation [11] :
where A = {A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A M } is the set of system assets (in terms of information, property, people, etc.), A V i is the value of A i , and p(A i ) is the probability of A i to be compromised.
B. SHS Model
An SHS refers to a stochastic process defined on a hybrid state space involving both continuous and discrete states [12] . The continuous states of SHSs evolve continuously, typically according to a differential equation indexed by the discrete state or mode. The switching between the discrete states is triggered by stochastic events. An SHS is represented as follows:
where Q = {q 1 , q 2 , . . .} is a finite set of discrete states; X ∈ R n is a set of continuous states; Init is the initial system states;
n is a family of vector fields that characterizes the dynamics of X in mode q ∈ Q; E = {e 1 , e 2 , . . .} is a finite set of stochastic events; φ = {φ e q : Q × R n → Q × R n } is a family of reset maps that describes how the transition changes system states; and μ = {μ e q : Q × R n → [0, +∞)} is a family of transition-time distributions that defines when transitions happen.
The physical process of ICPSs typically has continuous dynamics. Attacks may cause the dynamics of physical process to change. Different attack scenarios drive ICPSs to different operation conditions. Hence, an ICPS under attack can be naturally considered as an SHS. This paper uses SHS models to characterize the coupling between the continuous system dynamics and discrete attack behaviors in ICPSs.
III. PROPOSED RISK ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK
This paper presents a concise risk assessment framework. As shown in Fig. 1 , it is designed for assessing the physical impact caused by cyberattacks on ICPSs. The framework uses a BN to model the dependencies between cyber components, system vulnerabilities, attack path, and the likelihood of successful attacks. The CPT parameters of the BN model can be derived from the common vulnerability scoring system (CVSS) [13] , an open industry vulnerability database. With the BN model, as well as real-time intrusion detection evidences [14] , the probabilities of compromise for sensors and actuators can be inferred. Using these probabilities as inputs, an SHS model is employed to predict the evolution of the physical process. Then, it further assesses the C2P risk of ICPSs.
In Fig. 1 , q 0 represents the normal operation mode of the physical system. When a cyber-attack is launched, q 0 may transit into another hybrid state. In each hybrid state other than q 0 , the MTTSD of the physical process will be computed and it is further used to quantify the immediate C2P risk.
IV. ATTACK PROPAGATION MODELING
This section presents the details of BN modeling of the attack propagation process in ICPS cyber layer.
A. Structure of BN
In general, an attacker keeps exploiting system vulnerabilities for privilege escalation until the target is reached [15] . It is assumed that the goal of cyberattacks against ICPSs is to disrupt the physical system by maliciously manipulating sensors and actuators [16] , [17] . Therefore, the BN structure can be constructed with three types of nodes: VULnerability node, PRIvilege node, and TARget node. The VUL nodes represent the vulnerabilities of cyber components that can be exploited by attackers. The PRI nodes represent the host privileges that are required by attackers for further operations. The TAR nodes describe the attacks on sensors or actuators for aimed damage to the physical system. Moreover, it is assumed that a motivated attacker, who wants to penetrate deep into the ICPS network and manipulate sensors or actuators, will not waste any time with unnecessary actions [18] . Therefore, when building the BN network structure, we only consider the hosts and the associated vulnerabilities, which can help attacker move forward toward the targets.
B. Conditional Probability Tables
The tractability of CPT construction is generally referred to as the bottleneck of BN modeling. This is due to the large number of CPT parameters and complex dependencies between BN nodes [19] . The primary solution to this problem is the canonical gate, which reduces the number of CPT parameters significantly with the independence of causal influence assumption [19] . This paper adopts logical AND gate and logic OR gate [15] to alleviate the difficulty of specifying CPT parameters. A logic AND assumes that all the causes of an event Y i must be met to realize Y i . This is expressed as follows:
A logic OR only requires that at least one node in pa i be satisfied. It follows that
Though the logic gates offer great help on building the CPTs, the probability of success that the attacker exploits a vulnerability has to be estimated. After that, all the CPT parameters can be computed using (4) and (5) . In order to estimate the probability of a successful exploitation, the metrics provided by CVSS are used in this paper.
CVSS has three groups of metrics: base, temporal, and environmental. Specifically, only the exploitability subscore defined in the base group is considered since it evaluates the difficulty of exploiting a vulnerability. The exploitability subscore consists of access vector (S AV ), access complexity (S AC), and authentication (S AU ). All the scores of S AV, S AC, and S AU can be obtained from public vulnerability databases. Then, the probability of a successful exploitation on vulnerability is computed from the following equation [15] :
C. Attack Prediction
After the BN model is developed, the conditional probabilities of the TAR nodes are inferred based on real-time attack information, which is usually provided by intrusion detection systems. A large number of intrusion detection approaches have been proposed for ICPSs, as summarized in a recent survey paper [14] . Given a set of attack evidence E = {E 1 , E 2 , . . .}, each E i indicates that the corresponding ith BN node has been compromised by the attacker. Then, the Bayes theorem is used to update the posterior probability of the TAR nodes
where p(T i |E) is the conditional probability of T i given E, and p(E|T i ) is the conditional probability of E given T i . Also, with the inference capability of BNs, all the probabilities of each system asset to be compromised can be computed. Then, the cybersecurity risk is quantified using (2), which is the most common SRA method for ICPSs in the literature.
V. PHYSICAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT
This section employs an SHS model to analyze the system dynamics of ICPSs under attack. It further uses the SHS model to quantify the C2P risk by evaluating the system availability.
A. System Description
The physical process being controlled is modeled as a multivariable discrete-time linear time-invariant (LTI) system
where x k ∈ R n represents system states; u k ∈ R m means control actions; y k ∈ R l denotes sensor readings; w k ∈ R n and v k ∈ R l are uncorrelated zero-mean Gaussian noises with known covariance matrices W k and V k , respectively; and A, B, and C are matrices representing the dynamics of the physical process.
B. SHS Model
The attacker who aims to disrupt the physical process of an ICPS needs to manipulate the sensors or actuators to achieve aimed malicious goals. Thus, the physical system under attack can be described as follows:
where d u k and d y k are attacks on actuators and sensors, respectively.
Without loss of generality, define an attack scenario in the physical layer of ICPSs as a running state of all sensors and actuators. Here, we only consider two common states of sensors and actuators: normal or compromised. Accordingly, the total number of attack scenarios is
where h = m + l, and h! represents the factorial of h. Denote each attack scenario as a discrete mode, then the physical process under attack can be characterized by an SHS model, and (9) changes to
where q k ∈ {q 1 , q 2 , . . . , q Q } is the current mode, and d
are additive attack signals on the actuators and sensors in mode q k , respectively. Q is the total number of discrete modes, including both the normal mode and attack modes. Thus, Q = (Q 0 + 1).
As explained in Section IV, a BN model is employed to predict the attack behaviors. Assume that at each time instant k, the current discrete mode is q k = q i . With the BN model, we can predict the next mode from a mode transition probability vector π
It is worth mentioning that the attack scenarios discussed in this section only take the sensors and actuators into consideration. The components in the cyber layer are not included. Thus, the transition probability vector will change when more cyber components are compromised. Consequently, we need to generate new transition probability matrix, denoted as π k , once the intrusion detection system raises new alarms.
Then, we need to characterize the times when discrete mode transition happens. As we have associated each discrete mode with an attack scenario in terms of sensors and actuators, the discrete mode transition time is determined by the time interval between two consecutive attacks against the physical system of ICPSs, namely the sojourn time in a discrete mode. However, the attack intervals are unknown. It is suggested in [20] that the time needed for a successful vulnerability compromise follow an exponential distribution with a parameter 1/λ.
C. State Estimation
In order to assess the availability of the physical system of an ICPS under attack, the system states need to be estimated in each discrete mode. Then, current operation condition is evaluated.
As the compromised sensors or actuators may have random behaviors, i.e., attack signals are non-Gaussian and have unknown statistics, for each discrete mode, a robust state estimator needs to be designed in which its estimation error is decoupled from attack signals.
Because x k has arbitrary ordering, the state equation in (11) can be represented as follows when the system is within mode q i where part of the actuators are compromised
where 
where v q i k is the reduced measurement noise in mode q i . Accordingly, the SHS model changes to
Before an individual observer is designed for each discrete mode, we need to make sure that system (14) is observable when B q i a = 0. This is satisfied by
In order to design a robust unbiased minimum-variance state estimator for the system formulated in (14) , which is a discretetime LTI system with unknown inputs, the filter proposed in [21] is adopted in this paper. It has the following form (superscript q i is omitted for better readability):
wherex k is the estimate of x k and L k +1 is a gain matrix parameter to be designed. The estimator is unbiased if
Substituting (14a) and (16) into (17) gives
For the condition in (18) to hold regardless of the actuator attack signals, L k +1 should satisfy
Equation ( 
The solution to (19) is given by
where
T is the MoorePenrose pseudoinverse of CB a , Ψ = Υ(I − CB a (CB a ) + ), and Υ is any full row rank matrix with proper size. Γ k +1 is a design parameter.
For minimum-variance estimation, we need to find L k +1 that minimizes the trace of estimation error P k +1 under constraint (19) . P k +1 can be written as follows:
Let
Then, (22) is simplified to
Substituting (21) into (24) and letting the derivative of the trace of P k +1 equal to zero give
The result of (25) is given by
Substituting (26) 
D. C2P Risk Quantification
This section quantifies the physical impact of cyberattacks, namely the aforementioned C2P risk R. Equation (2) is the most general form for cyber-layer security risk assessment in ICPSs. When evaluating the risk of physical layer, some metrics related to reliability, availability, or dependability are widely used, e.g., the Mean-Time-To-Failure and Time-To-Shut-Down (TTSD). Since the C2P risk is the operational risk caused by cybersecurity issues, these two metrics should be integrated. In [22] , an equation R = P/TTSD is proposed to quantify C2P risk, where P is the occurrence probability of attacks. However, this method is too simple to take into account consecutive attacks as well as the case that only results in performance degradation. Motivated by this preliminary work in C2P risk quantification, this paper extends the availability metric TTSD into MTTSD. MTTSD describes the expected amount of time that the attacker needs to drive the physical process into an undesirable state.
MTTSD does not mean that the whole physical process will definitely shut down when the ICPS is under attack. The attacker may drive the physical process into a state with failures of some devices, defected output products or degraded real-time performance. In these cases, MTTSD is still applicable as long as attacks drive the system into an undesired state and the administrators can distinguish these different states using the process variables x k .
Suppose the system is in mode q i . k ], the attacker may launch another attack where the time interval between two consecutive attacks is described by an exponential distribution. Therefore, the effect of discrete mode switching on the TTSD should be taken into consideration. Suppose that the system enters mode q i at time T i , and the next discrete mode is q j . Then, the discrete mode transition probability vector π
, it means that a mode switching is expected to happen before the system enters an undesirable state. In this case, we need to predict the next discrete mode with π i k , compute the TTSD for each predicted mode, and then calculate the weighted sum as the current MTTSD. When T q i k > (T i + λ − k), which means that the physical process is expected to enter an undesirable or failure state before next attack has taken place, the MTTSD is set to T q i k . Accordingly, MTTSD is given by
After T q i k is computed, the following equation is proposed to quantify the real-time C2P risk:
where V T is the monetary loss caused by operation state switching in ICPS (e.g., abrupt shutdown and system degradation), and T max is the TTSD of the physical process when it is running without any attacks. Consequently, the shorter the MTTSD, the higher the C2P risk of the system.
VI. CASE STUDIES
In order to evaluate the performance of our risk assessment method, this section implements and tests the proposed method on a hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) simulation test bed. 
A. Experiment Setup
A boiling water power plant (BWPP) described in [23] is investigated here as an ICPS. Fig. 2 depicts the architecture of the HIL simulation test bed. The HIL test bed consists of two parts: the cyber part and the physical part. The physical part is simulated on an individual simulation host (SH). It includes the BWPP and sensors and actuators. Apart from the physical system, all other devices are real ones. This HIL test bed has the following components.
1) An administrator host (AH) and two PCs (C1 and C2) in the corporate network. 2) A human-machine interface (HM) and a data server (DS) in the supervisory network. 3) Three embedded controllers (N1, N2, and N3) in the control network. 4) A water valve (WV), a fuel valve (FV), a steam valve (SV), two pressure sensors (P1 and P2), two water level sensors (L1 and L2) and a sensor (GT) for reading the generated electricity in the field area. The corporate network of the ICPS is directly connected with the Internet. The supervisory network is isolated from the corporate network by a firewall (F1) and only AH has the privilege to access the supervisory network. Another firewall (F2) exists between the supervisory network and the control network. Both HM and DS can cross F2 to access the controllers. The devices in the supervisory layer communicate with each other through industrial Ethernet using Modbus transmission control protocol. The gateway (GW) between the supervisory network and the control network is responsible for protocol conversion. The controllers communicate with SH via an agent node, which is attached to the CAN bus in the control network. As shown in Fig. 2 , the dashed lines represent the connections between the controllers and the sensors and actuators. All these connections are actually implemented by software on SH.
There are three states to be controlled in the BWPP: drum pressure x 1 (kg/cm 2 ), electric output x 2 (MW ), and fluid density x 3 (kg/cm 3 ). Let u 1 , u 2 , u 3 denote fuel, steam, and water valve positions, respectively. Use y 1 , y 2 , y 3 , y 4 , and y 5 to represent the sensor readings of P1, P2, GT, L1, and L2, respectively. When the system is in the steady state, u 1 
Δx 1,k . The BWPP ICPS has some vulnerabilities, which are summarized in Table I . In Table I , the "Exploitability" column is the vulnerability exploitation probability computed from (6) . The parameter λ column is the expected amount of time that the attacker needs to exploit the vulnerability [20] . A typical value of λ is several minutes. The database of common vulnerabilities and exposures (CVE) provides detailed information about all these vulnerabilities except the vulnerability V 6 . V 6 is a Modbus vulnerability that Modbus protocol lacks authentication and encryption mechanisms. It allows attackers to easily send forged Modbus messages. This vulnerability is common in ICPSs due to the wide use of Modbus protocol in industrial equipment. Given the vulnerabilities listed in Table I , we construct a hypothetical cyber-attack process involving the following steps.
1) At the 20th minute, the attacker attacks AH by exploiting V 1 . This is a remote code execution vulnerability found in SIMATIC WinCC, an industrial monitoring software designed by Siemens. The exploitability of V 1 is 1, meaning that a beginner attacker can easily exploit it. 2) At the 52nd minute, the attacker gains the privilege to manipulate the WinCC server installed on AH. 3) At the 56th minute, the attacker performs a man-in-themiddle attack between HM and GW by exploiting Modbus protocol vulnerability. 4) At the 68th minute, the attacker successfully acts as HM to send forged Modbus commands to N1, N2, and N3. Meanwhile, the attacker could also send previously recorded packets to HM. 5) At the 104th minute, the attacker exploits vulnerability V 7 to launch a denial of service attack on P1 by injecting false structured query language (SQL) statements. 6) At the 120th minute, the attacker modifies the control variable u 1 of FV. 7) At the 128th minute, the attacker modifies the control variable u 2 of SV.
B. Implementation of the Proposed Method
Several steps are needed to derive the whole risk assessment model, which is shown in Fig. 1 . First, construct the BN network structure by figuring out all the hosts and associated vulnerabilities, which can help the attacker move toward the physical layer. Second, compute all the CPT parameters using the CVSS metrics. Third, find all the running states of the sensors and actuators in which the physical process can be estimated with the constraint (15) and (19) satisfied. Fourth, generate mode transition matrix π k with online intrusion detection evidence. Finally, the real-time C2P risk assessment can be performed. More detailed implementation steps of the proposed risk assessment method on the BWPP system are described as follows.
1) BN Model: Since we only consider the hosts and the associated vulnerabilities that help the attacker move toward the aimed target, host C1 and C2 are excluded because they have no privilege to access the supervisory network. Also, vulnerability V 3 is not considered since it only causes information leakage. The constructed BN is shown in Fig. 3 . In this figure, G represents TAR node (sensors or actuators), V indicates VUL node, and P denotes PRI node. It is assumed that the vulnerabilities of a host have a relationship of logic OR, i.e., they are independent of each other. The PRI and VUL nodes have a relationship of logic AND, implying that to compromise a host h, the attacker must gain the privilege of another host communicating with h and make use of at least one vulnerability of h at the same time. Under this condition, all CPTs can be computed by using the CVSS metrics.
2) SHS Model: After the BN is built and the CPT parameters are specified, real-time discrete mode transition matrix π k is generated from online intrusion detection evidence. For instance, an evidence set E = {V 1 , P AH , V 6 , P H M } means that vulnerability V 1 and V 6 have been exploited and host AH and HM have been compromised. Then, Bayes theorem (7) is employed to infer the probabilities of the sensors or actuators to be compromised. It is further used to construct the full mode transition probability matrix π k .
With reference to the attack steps described in Section VI-A, Fig. 4 gives a simple illustration of the mode transition process of the BWPP under attack. As there are too many possible hybrid modes, Fig. 4 gives only a small part of all possible modes. In  Fig. 4, q 0 represents the normal operation mode, q 1 represents the hybrid mode where y 1 is under attack, q 2 represents the mode where both y 1 and u 1 are compromised, and q 3 denotes the mode where y 1 , u 1 , and u 2 are corrupted.
In each of the hybrid modes other than q 0 , the MTTSD of the physical process is computed. Then, the immediate C2P risk is quantified. Take mode q 2 as an example. In this mode, both FV and P1 have been compromised. Then, the matrices A 
As the constraint (15) and (19) 
C. Result Analysis
Three experiments are carried out to predict the probabilities of different attack scenarios. In the experiments, the states of the physical process when it is under attack are estimated. Then, the real-time C2P risk is quantified.
1) Experiment 1-Attack Probability Prediction: In the first experiment, the probabilities of sensors and actuators to be compromised are predicted. For brevity, it is assumed that the two redundant sensors L2 and P2, and the sensor GT are invulnerable. From the constructed BN and real-time intrusion detection evidence, the probability p c of compromise for other sensors and actuators can be inferred. Fig. 5 shows p c for WV, FV, SV, and P1 when the ICPS is under attack. The attack steps have been described previously in Section VI-A. It is seen from Fig. 5 that p c increases as cyber-attack goes deeper in the ICPS network. Each attack step tends to produce a step change in p c . When a sensor or actuator is compromised, p c = 1. From the predicted real-time p c , the most important assets in urgent need of protection can be identified.
2) Experiment 2-State Estimation: As explained in Section VI-B, the constraint (15) and (19) are satisfied in mode q 2 and an unbiased state estimator (36) has been obtained for this hybrid mode. This allows real-time state estimation for mode q 2 in this experiment. As x 1 is the most important system state of the BWPP, its changes are observed when the physical process is under attack. It is assumed that the physical system is running in the steady state before the attacker modifies u 1 to 1.05u 1 at the 120th minute. The state estimation result is shown in Fig. 6 .
The green curve in Fig. 6 depicts the evolution of x 1 when the physical process is affected by the attack. It is seen from this figure that x 1 deviates from the normal due to the attack at the 120th minute. The tank will explode when x 1 becomes bigger than 250 kg/cm 2 at the 218th minute. The black curve in Fig. 6 is the estimate of x 1 . It is seen from the figure that the estimatê x 1 traces x 1 closely even when cyber-attack is in progress.
3) Experiment 3-C2P Risk Assessment: The third experiment is to compute the real-time C2P risk. As described in Section VI-A, there are seven attack steps altogether. The system states can be estimated in an unbiased minimum-variance sense in the first six steps because the constraint (15) and (19) are satisfied. Thus, the real-time C2P risk value is estimated for the first six steps. For the seventh step, the C2P risk reaches its maximum. In this experiment, V T is set to $10 000 dollars. As the BWPP responds quickly to control commands [23] , a small modification on u k can bring the BWPP to a failure state in a short period of time, typically in tens of minutes. Therefore, T max has a small value. It is set as T max = 320 min. Fig. 7 presents the real-time C2P risk of the BWPP ICPS under attack. As shown in Fig. 7 , the ICPS has a low risk level when the first attack takes place in the corporate network at the 20th minute. Later, when the attacker reaches the supervisory network, R increases dramatically (see the 68th minute). Then, the risk level goes much higher when the sensors or actuators are attacked at the 104th minute. When both u 1 and u 2 are compromised, the physical process is unobservable and R increases to its maximum, implying that the boiler turbine is likely to explode immediately.
D. Further Discussions
From different perspectives, the three experiments conducted previously show the effectiveness of our SRA method for ICPSs. The first experiment demonstrates that the proposed BN model reflects the security status of system components. The second one shows that our state estimator can robustly estimate system states when sensors and actuators are partially compromised. The third experiment presents the C2P risk curve, which describes the real-time risk level of the physical system. Table II compares our method with existing ones. It is seen from Table II that our risk assessment method provides a comprehensive way to quantify the real-time security risk of ICPSs under attack. In contrast to previous studies that focus only on the attacks in the cyber layer or the physical layer, our method combines BN with an SHS model to assess the C2P risk through analysis of cross-domain attacks in ICPSs.
For the cyber layer of ICPSs, a BN model of the attack propagation process is developed to infer the probability of attacks penetrating into the physical layer. BN is a mature probabilistic tool with widespread use for risk analysis in real computer networks. As the cyber part of ICPSs is also a computer network, BN can be easily adapted to real-world ICPSs. Moreover, with consideration of the difficulty of BN modeling in largescale ICPSs, the traditional BN model is extended with AND/OR gates. Furthermore, when real-time probabilistic inference is performed with BN, some nonrelevant nodes can be trimmed. For example, if a parent node of an OR gate is realized, other parent nodes are no longer relevant and thus can be trimmed. Trimming operations greatly reduce the combinatorial explosion.
As for the physical layer, an SHS model is used to describe the operation mode of the physical process. In each mode, the C2P risk is quantified by means of a robust state estimator, which is designed on the basis of the widely used Kalman filter. As there are too many hybrid modes in general for a complex ICPS, many such modes can be removed by assuming that an attacker has limited energy. In other words, the attacker cannot compromise many devices simultaneously or attack a device currently unreachable. In this way, many infeasible modes are removed, thus reducing the computational complexity.
VII. CONCLUSION
A new risk assessment method was presented in this paper to quantitatively evaluate the physical impact of cyberattacks on ICPSs. It uses a BN to describe the attack propagation process in the cyber layer. With the probabilities of the sensor and actuators being compromised as inputs, an SHS model is designed to predict the behaviors of the physical process. By computing the MTTSD metric after robustly estimating the process states, the system availability was evaluated and the real-time C2P risk was obtained.
Existing SRA methods for ICPSs consider either the cyber layer or the physical layer. In comparison, our method combines both layers, thus providing a cyber-physical-integrated way to quantify the impact of cyberattacks on ICPSs. With our method, the prediction of the likelihood of different attack scenarios becomes possible. This helps in the following: 1) To identify the assets in most urgent need of protection 2) To estimate system states without any prior knowledge about attack patterns 3) To assess real-time system risk level. There are a few aspects worth investigating in future work. Our method dealt with ICPSs with linear dynamics. While a large number of industrial processes are linear or can be linearized, there are highly nonlinear industrial processes that cannot be handled through linearization. How to design state estimator for nonlinear ICPSs is a direction for future work. In addition, our method in this paper assumed that cyberattacks will drive the physical process of ICPSs to an undesirable state. However, some ICPSs are resilient to certain types of cyberattacks. They are able to recover to the steady state in a short period of time after an attack. How to integrate our method with other steady-state availability analysis methods to handle this scenario is an interesting topic of research in the future.
Kaixing Huang received the B.S. degree in automation from the Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan, China, in 2012, and is currently working toward the Ph.D. degree in control science and control engineering with the School of Automation, Huazhong University of Science and Technology.
His research interests include security control of industrial control systems, information security, and artificial intelligence.
Chunjie Zhou received the B.S., M.S., and Ph.D. degrees in control theory and control engineering from the Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan, China, in 1988, 1991, and 2001, respectively.
He is currently a Professor with the School of Automation, Huazhong University of Science and Technology. His research interests include safety and security control of industrial control systems, theory and application of networked control systems, and artificial intelligence.
